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Abstract 
The recent amendments to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
created a two-tiered approach to discovery of electronically stored information 
(“ESI”).2   Responding parties must produce ESI that is relevant, not subject to 
privilege, and reasonably accessible.3  However, because some methods of 
storing ESI, such as on magnetic backup tapes and within enormous databases, 
require substantial cost to access and search their contents, the rules permit 
parties to designate those repositories as “not reasonably accessible” because of 
undue burden or cost.4  But even despite the difficulty in searching for ESI, the 
party’s duty to preserve potentially responsive evidence remains; it simply 
gains the option to forgo poring over the material.5  Further, the court might 
nevertheless compel production if the requesting party demonstrates good 
cause.6   
Regardless of whether the responding party believes certain documents to be 
reasonably accessible or not, courts may still require their production.   In such 
cases, the court may then choose to order production, but shift the costs of 
doing so to the requesting party.  Throughout this process, the burden and cost 
of production are central themes.   Their determination is fluid, varying from 
                                                 
1  We must give special thanks to Mr. Schwerha’s research assistant, Mr. Christopher Kovach.  
He helped with research and initially drafted parts of our article.  His efforts and expertise 
were invaluable.  
2 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B), Advisory Committee Note of 2006. 
6 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
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case to case and even over time in the same situation.   Nowhere is this more 
evident than where a responding party has numerous, geographically dispersed 
computers under its control that may contain responsive ESI to a request for 
production of documents.  Traditionally, a responding party would be forced to 
make a decision of whether or not to send out computer forensic experts to all 
of these locations to make forensically sound copies of all of those computers 
and then analyze each.   This process is time consuming and costly.  Recently, 
several companies have put forth substantial solutions that facially allow a 
responding party to capture and analyze data on geographically dispersed 
computers remotely.  That process, in general, is often defined as remote 
forensics.   
The question is now whether newly available remote forensic solution indicate 
that all networked computers are readily accessible under the current state of 
the law.  This article attempts to define remote forensics, examines a selection 
of applicable court decisions, and then analyzes the currently available 
commercial software packages that allow remote forensics. 
 1. REMOTE FORENSICS 
In small companies, where all hardware and software is local, evidence 
acquisition is a relatively simple process.  IT staff arrives on scene, removes 
the physical hard disk and images it in any number of ways.  In mission critical 
situations, the hard disk could be cloned and the duplicate hard disk could be 
put back into the machine (often without the employee’s knowledge) while the 
original disk is taken for examination. 
In a large corporation with offices in many locations, the acquisition model is 
much different.  Decisions are impacted by budget and personnel.   A company 
may not be able to afford to send a seasoned IT person to a remote location to 
do the acquisition.  While gone, the centrally located IT staff is short handed 
and the company has to pay for travel expenses which can be substantial 
depending on the location and duration of the acquisition.  If repeated, this 
process can be quite troublesome. 
The idea of remote forensics is to allow the IT personnel to forensically 
examine any computer in the company network without being physically 
present at its location.  The challenge is to do this in a forensically sound 
manner so the evidence collected could be submitted in court.7  In general, 
remote forensic processes are less sound as they typically involve a running 
machine, sometimes being used by the employee at the time the evidence is 
being collected.  Typical capabilities are previewing the target computer (see 
files and processes), performing keyword searches, capturing a physical 
                                                 
7  In order to be submitted in court, the evidence must be authentic – that is – exactly what the 
proponent claims it is.  If the evidence has been significantly altered, then it generally would 
not be authentic and in many cases would not be allowed in court. 
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memory dump, and acquiring a forensic copy of the remote hard disk. 
Very large companies may purchase and deploy a large scale enterprise-wide 
solution with the expectation that they will repeatedly have to perform such 
investigations.  These solutions can be very expensive but often save the 
company money in the long term.  Solutions such as these often have other 
benefits in addition to their forensics capabilities such as security and 
compliance auditing.  However, the cost and installation process has put them 
well beyond the reach of many small to mid-sized companies.  Smaller 
companies likely do not have the need or budget to invest in  an enterprise-
wide software solution.  They are more likely to choose a smaller tool that 
would allow installation after an incident has occurred. 
The need for a viable remote forensic solution is not new; but, the increase in 
networking of geographically dispersed computers has greatly increased this 
need in recent years.8   In December, 2006, the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure were modified with regard to electronic discovery, forcing judges 
and attorneys to address the issue. 
2. DEFINING “REASONABLY ACCESSIBLE” 
Anticipating the changing nature of technology and the disparity in resources 
among different parties, the rules only define “not reasonably accessible” in 
terms of burden and cost.9  Hence the rules ignore technological  issues and 
focus instead on only economic concerns.  Because of this, parties may identify 
for themselves what they consider to be not reasonably accessible, given their 
own means and opportunity.  Preliminary discovery may be needed to 
determine whether a party’s claim is justifiable. 
Despite the seemingly wide-open definition of reasonably accessible, some 
guidelines exist, based primarily on the manner in which data is stored.10  
Explicit examples offered by the advisory committee include “back-up tapes 
intended for disaster recovery purposes,” “legacy data that was ‘deleted’ but 
remains in fragmented form, requiring a modern version of forensics to restore 
and retrieve,” and “databases that were designed to create certain information 
in certain ways and cannot readily create very different kinds or forms of 
information.”11  In the seminal case of Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, Judge 
Scheindlin identified five categories of data: 
                                                 
8   Pencock, Smith & Wilson, Design and Implementation of a Remote Forensics System, 
Information Networking Institute, Carnegie Mellon University (May, 2005) 
(http://www.foundstone.com/us/resources/whitepapers/remote_forensics_systems.pdf) 
9 J.M. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice § 26.53[1] (3d ed. 2005). 
10 See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
11 Memorandum from Hon. Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure to Hon. David F. Levi, Chair, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice 
and Procedure 34 (May 27, 2005), available at  
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/supct1105/Excerpt_CV_Report.pdf. 
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1. Active, online data: "On-line storage is generally provided by 
magnetic disk. It is used in the very active stages of an 
electronic records [sic] life . . . Examples of online data 
include hard drives. 
2. Near-line data: "This typically consists of a robotic storage 
device (robotic library) that houses removable media, uses 
robotic arms to access the media, and uses multiple read/write 
devices to store and retrieve records. . . . Examples include 
optical disks. 
3. Offline storage/archives: "This is removable optical disk or 
magnetic tape media, which can be labeled and stored in a 
shelf or rack. Off-line storage of electronic records is 
traditionally used for making disaster copies of records and 
also for records considered 'archival' in that their likelihood of 
retrieval is minimal. Accessibility to off-line media involves 
manual intervention and is much slower than on-line or near-
line storage. Access speed may be minutes, hours, or even 
days, depending on the access-effectiveness of the storage 
facility. . .” 
4. Backup tapes: "A device, like a tape recorder, that reads data 
from and writes it onto a tape. Tape drives have data capacities 
of anywhere from a few hundred kilobytes to several 
gigabytes. Their transfer speeds also vary considerably. . . The 
disadvantage of tape drives is that they are sequential-access 
devices, which means that to read any particular block of data, 
you need to read all the preceding blocks." . . . Backup tapes 
also typically employ some sort of data compression, 
permitting more data to be stored on each tape, but also 
making restoration more time-consuming and expensive, 
especially given the lack of uniform standard governing data 
compression. 
5. Erased, fragmented or damaged data: "When a file is first 
created and saved, it is laid down on the [storage media] in 
contiguous clusters. . . As files are erased, their clusters are 
made available again as free space. Eventually, some newly 
created files become larger than the remaining contiguous free 
space. These files are then broken up and randomly placed 
throughout the disk." Such broken-up files are said to be 
"fragmented," and along with damaged and erased data can 
only be accessed after significant processing. 
Judge Scheindlin categorized the first three types as accessible and the final 
two as inaccessible, noting that accessible data is “stored in a readily usable 
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format . . . [and] does not need to be restored or otherwise manipulated to be 
usable.”12  On the other hand, inaccessible data is not readily usable:  backup 
tapes, fragmented data, and deleted files need to be restored, defragmented, and 
undeleted.13  The key difference is the amount of effort needed to access raw 
data and reconstruct relevant information.  The more  burdensome and time 
consuming it is to retrieve information, the more likely courts would 
characterize the data as not reasonably accessible.   
 These hurdles can exist in the form of “acquiring or creating software 
to retrieve potentially responsive electronic data or otherwise require the 
responding party to render inaccessible electronic information accessible.”14  
This seems to suggest that parties must rely upon software programs and other 
tools within their control, or usable at little to no additional cost, but notably 
refrains from imposing any sort of state of the art standard.  However, it also 
hints at a minimum level of compliance, intimating that some standards exist, 
and not meeting them would never render data inaccessible.15 
3. RECENT COURT CASES 
But no explicit rule exists.16  Since the amendments to the Federal Rules, 
magistrate and district justices have looked to the circumstances of each 
individual case in determining whether information is not reasonably 
accessible.  Precedent currently remains relatively sparse. 
The following cases, nevertheless help shed light on the current workable 
definition of Rule 26(b)(2)(B).  In these cases, the measure of accessibility was 
primarily calculated based upon the cost of producing the data in question, and 
the courts allocation of the costs would generally encourage organizations to 
store data in reasonably accessible formats.  Remote forensic tools make it 
cheaper and easier to access a broad range of information on computer 
networks, reducing the burden on producing parties. 
                                                 
12 Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 320. 
13 Id. 
14 American Bar Association Civil Discovery Standards § IV.10 at 59-60 (August 2004), 
http://www.abanet.org/litigation/discoverystandards/2004civildiscoverystandards.pdf. 
15 See Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., No. A. 04-84, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 16662, *19-20 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 5, 2006) (noting that a “peculiar computer system” is 
no excuse for non-production); CP Solutions PTE, Ltd. v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. 04-2150, 2006 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27053, *14 (D. Conn. Feb. 6, 2006) (stating that, despite the fact that email 
attachments were “created with different software programs,” there is no excuse for 
producing “emails and attachments in a jumbled, disorganized fashion.”). 
16 See, e.g., Best Buy Stores, L.P. v. Developers Diversified Realty Corp., No. 05-2310, 2007 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7580, *2-3 (D. Minn. Feb. 1, 2007) (holding that defendants had failed to 
prove that information stored on backup tapes was not reasonably accessible). 
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 3(3) 
 
10 
 
3.1  Quinby v. WestLB AG17   
In this sexual harassment suit, plaintiff moved for sanctions against defendant 
arising out of a dispute concerning discovery of emails in defendant’s 
possession.  Plaintiff requested that seventeen current and former WestLB 
employees’ email accounts be searched for “certain terms alleged to refer to 
plaintiff in particular or that are sexist in general.”18  Defendant claimed the 
request was overly broad and amounted to an undue burden.  The magistrate 
judge referred both parties to Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC19 and ordered 
affidavits addressing its cost-shifting factors.20  Defendant was also ordered to 
“restore, as a sample, the back-up tape or tapes that contain emails from 
February 2003 into a readable, searchable format.”21  Defendant created “daily 
back-up tapes, consisting of about twenty to forty tapes . . . [and] stores daily 
back-up tapes for fifteen weeks and then recycles the tapes.  Similarly, monthly 
tapes are stored for thirteen months before they are recycled and annual tapes 
for two years.”22 
Although the case predates the amendments, it is nevertheless notable because 
of its references to Zubulake and the conclusion that backup tapes were the 
“most complete source for the emails and retrieving the emails from any other 
source would have resulted in either an incomplete production or duplication of 
effort.”23  Additionally, the judge declared that archiving data onto back-up 
tapes makes that data inaccessible.24  Further, defendants could not be 
sanctioned for choosing to preserve data on backup tapes; that practice satisfies 
the preservation obligation, even if it renders data inaccessible.25 
In later proceedings, the judge stated the position that “cost-shifting is only 
appropriate where electronic discovery imposes an undue burden or expense,” 
but also added that “if a party creates its own burden or expense by converting 
into an inaccessible format data that it should have reasonably foreseen would 
be discoverable material at a time when it should have anticipated litigation, 
                                                 
17 Quinby v. WestLB AG, No. 04-7406, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35583 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 
2005). 
18 Id. at *2. 
19 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
20 Id. at 322 (creating a new seven-factor test to determine whether cost-shifting is appropriate; 
the seven factors are: (1) the extent to which the request is specifically tailored to discover 
relevant information; (2) the availability of such information from other sources; (3) the total 
cost of production, compared to the amount in controversy; (4) the total cost of production, 
compared to the resources available to each party; (5) the relative ability of each party to 
control costs and its incentive to do so; (6) the importance of the issues at stake in the 
litigation; and (7) the relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the information.) 
21 Quinby, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35583, at *4. 
22 Id. at *23. 
23 Id. at *18. 
24 Id. at *26. 
25 Id. at *27 n. 10. 
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then it should not be entitled to shift the costs of restoring and searching the 
data.”26  He reiterated, however, that backup tapes, at least in this situation, are 
not reasonably accessible – and noted that cost-shifting is a useful tool to 
encourage parties to store data in readily accessible formats.27 
3.2  Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc.28 
SCC filed a declaratory judgment action against Lexmark, seeking a judgment 
that its off-brand ink cartridges did not violate the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act.  Lexmark disagreed and filed numerous counterclaims.  SCC 
moved for an order compelling Lexmark to respond to a series of Requests for 
Production of Documents, including records comprising Lexmark’s “pre-sale 
customer inquiry database.”29  Prior to June 30, 2004, Lexmark allegedly told 
SCC that as many as 60,000 records in that database could be responsive to its 
document requests; however, Lexmark refused to produce the database, citing 
an undue burden.30 
Lexmark explained that it “maintained its pre-sale customer inquiry database: 
(a) in a form that is not text-searchable; (b) using software that is no longer 
commercially available; and (c) software which it modified for its own use.”31  
Therefore, according to Lexmark, the information was not reasonably 
accessible, even though it offered on three separate occasions to make its 
database available to SCC under limited conditions – namely, at Lexmark’s 
facilities.  SCC replied that Lexmark’s terms are unacceptable, “chiefly 
because Lexmark represents that the only way to retrieve information from this 
database is by inputting a specific caller's name, phone number, or call 
reference number (which is an internal designation created by Lexmark.)”32  In 
other words, SCC thought the process would be pointless.   
The magistrate judge agreed, holding that Lexmark must produce its database 
in a “reasonably usable form,” and that it cannot “hide behind its peculiar 
computer system as an excuse” for non-production.33  Because of the 
proprietary nature of Lexmark’s database, the judge categorized the 
information as “Outside Counsel Only,” to be produced under a protective 
order governing discovery in the case.34 
                                                 
26 Quinby v. WestLB AG, No. 04-7406, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64531, *29 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 5. 
2006). 
27 Id. 
28 Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., No. 04-84-KSF, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 16662 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 5, 2006). 
29 Id. at *15. 
30 Id. at *16-17. 
31 Id. at *18. 
32 Id. at *19 (internal quotations omitted). 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
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3.3 Semsroth v. City of Wichita35 
Plaintiffs, former police officers, sued the defendant city and police department 
and alleged sexual and gender discrimination.  They requested copies of emails 
from supervisors; the emails existed in current active user files and on a backup 
tape.36  Because the active files would not show deleted emails, the officers 
requested production of the backup tape, which the city would need to restore 
to an email server, since it keeps backups for disaster recovery purposes only.37  
No dispute exists to the relevance of the material; the crux of the dispute is 
who will bear the costs. 
Plaintiffs argued that the cost should be borne by the producing party, and that 
the expenditure of these costs cannot constitute an “undue burden.”  The city 
responded that plaintiffs should cover some of the costs, because “it would not 
buy [search] software absent an order of the Court, there is no evidence that the 
search of the back-up tape will even find any of the words identified by 
Plaintiffs for use in a search, and the burden of compliance with Plaintiffs' 
requested discovery would be . . . undue.”38 The magistrate judge noted 
that, under amended rule 26(b)(2)(B), the burden of establishing that 
information is not reasonably accessible falls on the city; and that plaintiffs 
can, despite that undue burden, obtain discovery by showing good cause.39 
Plaintiffs alleged that the city’s choice of backup tapes should warrant denying 
its motion out of hand.  The judge disagreed, finding that the tapes were a 
reasonable storage method, and distinguished it from Quinby, where defendant 
converted data into an inaccessible format when it should have reasonably 
expected litigation.40    
Importantly, the judge distinguished mediums that might be considered 
“inaccessible” under the definition of the rule and whether an undue burden or 
cost exists.  The amendment made clear that “any inaccessibility” must be due 
to an undue burden or cost; he rejected the idea of blanket exceptions into the 
rule, even for traditionally inaccessible mediums like backup tapes.41  Here, the 
cost to the city would amount to $3,374.95.42  Ultimately, the judge held that 
the cost to the city was of restoring the single backup tape at issue did not 
amount to an undue burden or cost.43  And because the emails were reasonably 
accessible, the cost-shifting factors outlined in Rule 26(b)(2)(C) were not 
                                                 
35 Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 239 F.R.D. 630 (D. Kan. 2006). 
36 Id. at 632. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 633. 
39 Id. at 634. 
40 Id. at 635 n.5. 
41 Id. at 637. 
42 Id. at 638. 
43 Id. at 640. 
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implicated.44  But had the cost of restoring the tape been greater, the court 
noted that cost-shifting “would easily have supported a shifting of some of the 
costs to the Plaintiffs.”45 
3.4  Ameriwood Indus., Inc. v. Liberman46 
Plaintiff alleged that defendants, while employed by plaintiffs, used 
confidential information to sabotage plaintiff’s business relationships and steal 
clients.  Defendants cited poor business management on the part of plaintiff.  
Plaintiff moved to compel defendants’ compliance with its document requests 
and interrogatories.  Included was a request for production of “a mirror image 
of all computers used by any defendant to conduct business on his own behalf 
or on behalf of plaintiff . . . including defendants’ personal home computers . . 
.”47  Plaintiff asserted that defendants forwarded customer information, trade 
secrets, and account information to their personal email accounts; it also 
guessed that defendants concealed their actions.  Plaintiff filed with the court 
an email sent from defendant, while still employed by plaintiff, to an employee 
at Samsung.  Because of this, the court found that other relevant emails may 
still exist on defendants’ computers.48   
However, because defendants submitted affidavits describing the “significant 
costs of copying the hard drives, recovering deleted information, and 
translating the recovered data into searchable and reviewable formats,” the 
court concluded that the information was not readily accessible because of 
undue burden or cost.49  Despite this, the court nevertheless found that plaintiff 
had shown good cause to obtain mirror images; it crafted a three-step 
“imaging, recovery, and disclosure process [that] provides the requesting party 
sufficient access to information that is not reasonably accessible and ensures 
the process does not place an undue burden or cost on the responding party.”50 
In a later proceeding, defendant requested all internal emails pertaining to 
plaintiff’s business and its management from October 2005 through March 
2006.  The request identified six people that may possess responsive 
documents – who plaintiff identified as having 52,124 potentially responsive 
emails and 4,413 document files.  The court found the information not 
reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost, and further held that 
defendants failed to show good cause to order disclosure.51 
                                                 
44 Id.  
45 Id. 
46 Ameriwood Indus., Inc. v. Liberman, No. 4:06CV524-DJS, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93380 
(E.D. Mo. Dec. 27, 2006). 
47 Id. at *4-5. 
48 Id. at *10-11. 
49 Id. at *12-13. 
50 Id. at *15. 
51 Ameriwood Indus., Inc. v. Liberman, No. 4:06CV524-DJS, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10791 
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3.5  Cenveo Corp. v. Slater52 
In a case similar to Ameriwood, plaintiff alleged that its former employees 
misappropriated trade secrets and confidential information.  Plaintiff sought to 
use a mirror imaging method to access defendants’ hard drives, whereby the 
image would be turned over to a third-party forensics expert for analysis; it 
asked defendants for a privilege log as well.  On the other hand, defendants 
offered to produce the image themselves and use plaintiff’s search terms.53 
Because of the interplay between plaintiff’s claims and defendants’ computers, 
the court granted plaintiff’s request to select an expert to oversee the imaging 
process.54  The court found that plaintiff’s interest in obtaining the information 
outweighed defendants’ burden in producing it, obviating the need to show 
good cause to compel production.55  Notably, the court found Ameriwood 
instructive and created a three-part imaging, recovery and disclosure process.56 
3.6  Hedenburg v. Aramark American Food Services.57 
In this run of the mill employment discrimination and wrongful termination 
case, defendant employer sought a “mirror image” of plaintiff’s home 
computer hard drive, arguing that access to such computers is common and 
normal in employment cases; defendant offered to have the hard drive sent to a 
“special master” to avoid recovery of non-discoverable information. 
The court rejected defendant’s motion to compel discovery, calling it a “fishing 
expedition,” noting that a “thorough search of an adversary’s computer is 
sometimes permitted where the contents of the computer go to the heart of the 
case.”58  Here, plaintiff claims that she went through her files and found 
nothing, so defendant lacks the good cause necessary under 26(b)(2)(b) to 
investigate.  The gist of cases like this is that, in some cases, parties from 
whom discovery is being sought may not have to prove their information is not 
readily accessible – provided that the request is obviously a fishing expedition.  
In other words, some courts seem comfortable requiring that the requesting 
party establish good cause before turning to the question of accessibility.  (Or 
perhaps the “undue burden” and “good cause” inquiries are sometimes 
conflated.) 
                                                                                                                      
(E.D. Mo. Feb. 12, 2007). 
52 Cenveo Corp. v. Slater, No. 06-CV-2632, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8281 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 
2007). 
53 Id. at *2. 
54 Id. at *4. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at *5. 
57 Hedenburg v. Aramark Am. Food Services, No. C06-5267 RBL, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3343 
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 17, 2007). 
58 Id. at *3. 
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3.7  Best Buy Stores, L.P. v. Developers Diversified Realty Corp.59 
Defendants objected to the magistrate judge’s granting of plaintiff’s motion to 
compel defendants to produce documents.  The magistrate judge “rejected 
defendants’ conclusory statements that compliance with their electronic 
discovery obligations . . . is cost prohibitive,” even though the documents were 
stored on backup tapes.60  Nor had defendants “met their burden to establish 
that the information sought ‘is not reasonably accessible because of undue 
burden or cost.’”61 
In the case before the district court, defendants’ expert provided cost estimates 
for recovering the information stored on backup tapes and requested a deadline 
for those files that were not readily available.  Plaintiff opposed the 
modification.  The court found that “a modification of the deadline might be 
warranted if compliance with the deadline is in fact technologically 
impossible,” but affirmed the magistrate judge’s order in all respects, including 
her refusal to automatically define backup tapes as not readily accessible.62 
3.8  Peskoff v. Faber63 
Plaintiff sought to recover damages from defendant’s venture capital fund, 
alleging fraud in the inducement, breach of fiduciary duty, and other related 
causes of action.  Pursuant to an earlier order to compel, defendant searched 
computer systems and produced relevant emails; however, at issue is plaintiff’s 
contention that more emails exist and have not been produced.64  The 
magistrate judge found the search inadequate: 
All of the unopened emails in the Inbox--a total of fourteen--are dated 
the same day, a date following plaintiff's departure . . . The 10,436 
emails in the "Old Mail" subfolder are all unopened. The emails in the 
"Old Mail" subfolder are for the period June 25, 2003, to April 14, 
2004, but the emails in the 65 other subfolders are all dated for the 
period June 2000 to June 2001.  Thus, there are gaps of several years 
among the various subfolders with no emails whatsoever during these 
time periods. While there may be reasons why this is so, on this record 
all one can say is that this phenomenon is inexplicable.65 
The judge stated that parties are relieved of producing information not 
reasonably accessible, and if good cause is shown, discovery may be ordered 
and cost-shifting taken into consideration; however, he noted the negative 
                                                 
59 Best Buy Stores, L.P. v. Developers Diversified Realty Corp., No. 05-2310, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 7580 (D. Minn. Feb. 1, 2007). 
60 Id. at *2. 
61 Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B)). 
62 Id. at *3-4. 
63 Peskoff v. Faber, 240 F.R.D. 26 (D.D.C. 2007). 
64 Id. at 28. 
65 Id. at 30. 
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corollary:  “accessible data must be produced at the cost of the producing 
party.”66  Because of this, the judge ordered defendant to conduct an additional 
search at his own expense.67 
3.9  EEOC v. Boeing Co.68 
Defendant designated prior testimony instead of live witnesses as responsive to 
topics in plaintiff’s Rule 30(b)(6) deposition.  Plaintiff moved for an order to 
compel live witness testimony.  Through one of the topics at issue, plaintiff 
sought to discover all bases for defendant’s claim that the retrieval of emails 
responsive to plaintiff’s request for production of documents would cost at 
least $55,000.69 
The court noted that, in its earlier opinion, it had “no reason to doubt” 
defendant’s cost estimate, and that plaintiff had not shown good cause to 
justify the discovery.  Here, plaintiff did not claim that defendant’s cost 
estimate is relevant to its case; it simply wanted to know how the number was 
calculated.  The court held that plaintiff cannot raise an issue that “it should 
have raised in its earlier motions to compel,” and denied that portion of its 
motion.70 
3.10  Wells v. Xpedx71 
Plaintiff moved to compel discovery of emails of seven of defendant’s 
employees during various time periods  in the years 2002  and 2003.  Plaintiff 
further contended that defendant implemented a new email deletion policy in 
2003, with emails being deleted after 90 days unless marked for retention.  
However, under this policy, automatically deleted emails could not be restored 
without the consent of defendant’s legal department.  Moreover, plaintiff 
argued that defendant’s archives, “legal hold” folders, and backup systems 
might contain the emails in question – and that corporate representatives could 
help him determine whether the emails still exist. 
Defendant stated it produced all relevant emails and that, because of the policy, 
any emails not marked for retention were deleted after 90 days. 
However, the court noted that “[d]eleted emails are, in most cases, not 
irretrievably lost.”72  And the producing party has the obligation to “search 
available electronic systems for deleted emails and files.”73  The court stated 
                                                 
66 Id. at 31. 
67 Id. 
68 EEOC v. Boeing Co., No. CV-05-03034-PHX-FJM, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29107 (D. Ariz. 
Apr. 17, 2007). 
69 Id. at *7. 
70 Id. at *8. 
71 Wells v. Xpedx, No. 8:05-CV-2193-T-EAJ, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29610 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 23, 
2007). 
72 Id. at *3 (internal quotations omitted). 
73 Id. (quoting Peskoff v. Faber, 20 F.R.D. 26 (D.D.C. 2007)). 
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that it lacked sufficient information to determine whether defendant produced 
all responsive emails; it ordered the parties to confer in good faith concerning 
the matter and deferred ruling on the motion to compel discovery. 
No subsequent history concerned ESI, so presumably the parties agreed – 
however, this case is notable because email retention policies do not, in and of 
themselves, trump electronic discovery rules, because even deleted emails 
might still exist.  Thus, a policy that truly did delete emails after a specified 
amount of time (for example, by not retaining them in backup servers) might 
serve a party best, for otherwise, the information could be deemed reasonably 
accessible. 
3.11  Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Bunnell 74 
In this case, one relevant question was at issue: is a computer’s random access 
memory (RAM) subject to discovery under Rule 34?  The court, despite 
acknowledging that RAM is temporary at best, holds that RAM is ESI under 
the circumstances of the case.  Much of their argument rests on the definition 
of the word “stored” – noting that RAM, by definition, stores data and that 
Rule 34 is, by definition, a broad rule meant to encompass all kinds of data. 
After the litany of semantic arguments, the court  cited a Ninth Circuit case 
from 1993 dealing with copyright infringement which held that information 
stored in RAM  satisfies the Copyright Act’s statutory prerequisites,” namely 
that “the medium store information with a degree of permanence and for ‘more 
than a transitory duration’.”75 
The importance of the trend to find information stored in RAM discoverable 
cannot be overstated – although one could make a solid argument that anything 
stored in RAM is not reasonably accessible, courts can still compel production 
of inaccessible records (regardless of how costly production may be) upon a 
showing of good cause.  In some cases, these costs can be relatively 
astronomical.76 
3.12  Garcia v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co. of America 77 
In this disability claim case, plaintiff sued defendant insurance company, 
claiming that she was totally disabled.  The insurance company learned that 
plaintiff actually attended college, law school, and graduate school and wanted 
to determine whether she was actually disabled.  It requested plaintiff’s emails 
from her university, and the university in turn sent the emails to plaintiff’s 
                                                 
74 Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Bunnell, 245 F.R.D. 443 (C.D. Cal. 2007). 
75 Id. at 447-48 (quoting Mai Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 517-18 (9th 
Cir. 1993)). 
76 See, e.g., Kentucky Speedway, LLC v. NASCAR, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92028 (E.D. Ky. 
Dec. 18, 2006) (discovery costs amounted to $3M USD in five months). 
77 Garcia v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co. of Am., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86639 (D. Colo. Nov. 13, 
2007). 
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counsel, who reviewed the documents.  But there was a large discrepancy 
between what the university sent to plaintiff’s lawyer and what the lawyer 
produced to the insurance company – plaintiff submitted 10 emails and a 
privilege log with 135 other emails; the DVD on which the emails were burned 
contained 4,000 emails with 1,500 attachments. 
Plaintiff’s counsel persisted; the insurance company moved to compel 
discovery. In response to that motion, plaintiff’s counsel (still persisting) 
doubted that other emails existed and cited computer illiteracy as his reason.  
In essence, this fell under a 26(b)(2)(B) claim, since the emails were 
presumably not reasonably accessible to plaintiff or her lawyer.  The court 
summarily rejected that argument and compelled discovery, noting that 
plaintiff was “on notice” when defense counsel notified her of the problems 
with the DVD.  However, the court does suggest that good faith technical 
ignorance might excuse the attorney’s initial dealings – but good faith mistakes 
can only go so far. 
3.13 Disability Rights Council of Greater Washington v. Washington 
Metropolitan Transit Authority78 
This suit involved a claim that the Defendant failed to provide adequate 
transportation services to disabled persons.79  In section III of the opinion, the 
Court addressed the Defendant’s failure to preserve electronically stored 
information, as well as the Defendant’s claim that certain ESI in its possession 
was not readily accessible. 
Plaintiff had moved the court to compel the Defendant to produce backup tapes 
of certain electronic documents that the Defendant had produced since the 
litigation had started.  Though the Complaint had been filed on March 25, 
2004, the Defendant allegedly did nothing to implement a litigation hold until 
June, 2006.  In the meantime the Defendants had failed to implement a 
litigation hold and allowed routine deletion of emails after 60 days, despite the 
fact that litigation had actually commenced.  The court chastised the 
Defendants and then considered the Plaintiff’s request to force the Defendant  
to search its backup tapes for any information that had been deleted. 80  The 
Plaintiff argued that the Defendant should restore the monthly backup tapes to 
a searchable database.  The Defendants resisted on the principles of burden and 
expense.81  The court noted that it was hesitant to permit a party who obviously 
failed to preserve evidence argue that the remaining evidence is inaccessible.82  
Nevertheless, the court skipped the analysis of accessibility, and merely ruled 
                                                 
78  Disability Rights Council of Greater Washington v. Washington Metropolitan Transit 
Authority, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39605 (D.D.C., June 1, 2007) 
79  Disability Rights, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39605 *1 (D.D.C., June 1, 2007) 
80  Id. at *24. 
81  Id. at *25. 
82  Id. at *26. 
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that that there was good cause to order production under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26(b)(2)(C).83 
3.14  Petcou v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc.84 
This was an employment discrimination case where the Plaintiff was 
requesting emails from 1998 through 2006, including deleted emails.  To 
comply with same, the Defendant was going to have to restore and search 
backup tapes.  The Plaintiff wanted 5,300 employees’ email searched.  
However, the respondent argued that those tapes were not reasonably 
accessible due to burden and cost.85   
The Defendant argued that in order to comply with the Plaintiff’s request it 
would have to restore numerous backup tapes at a cost of $325 - $365 per tape. 
86  The total for each employee was going to be $79,300.87  The court then 
found that the producer met its burden of proving that the emails were not 
reasonably accessible. 
The court then undertook determination of whether good cause was 
demonstrated in consideration of rule 26(b)(2)(B).  Upon considering the 
arguments from both sides, the court ruled that there was not good cause, 
reasoning that “the costs of searching the tapes would outweigh the benefits.”88  
Defining the words “reasonably accessible” remains unclear; the legal 
landscape is still chaotic, although some courts, like the Southern District of 
New York, seem more likely than others to rule on certain forms of 
information.  But despite this uncertainty, common themes have emerged:  
whenever a party objects to discovery on the basis of information being not 
reasonably accessible, it must support that argument with sufficient evidence.89  
Boilerplate language and conclusory statements, like the kind used by 
defendants in Best Buy, who likely assumed that backup tapes were always 
inaccessible, are rarely accepted.  Courts, becoming increasingly technically 
savvy (or at least economically conversant) want cost-benefit analyses; this 
means that parties without the benefit of experts to conduct these analyses, like 
individual plaintiffs, may face difficulty. 
                                                 
83  The reader might also want to consider Benton v. Dlorah, Inc. 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80503 
(D. Kan. Oct. 30, 2007). In that case, upon consideration of a motion to compel production of 
deleted emails, the court ordered same, stating: “Deleted documents should be retrievable 
from her computer system and [thereby] remain within her control.” Id. at 7.   It is important 
because the court essentially decided that deleted emails were reasonably accessible. 
84  Petcou v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13723 (N.D. Ga. Feb, 
2008) 
85  Petcou, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13723 *2. 
86  Id.  
87  Id.  
88  Id. at * 3. 
89 See O’Bar v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs., Inc., No. 5:04-CV-00019-W, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
32497, *23 n.6 (W.D.N.C. May 2, 2007). 
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Producing parties should have solid numbers ready – and must be able to argue 
effectively that such numbers pose an undue burden.  However, the argument 
must be kept in context, taking into consideration not only the amount in 
controversy but also the parties’ assets – $55,000 is minimal to a multinational 
corporation like Boeing.  Hence while the court might impose a duty to 
investigate upon individual plaintiffs, it would be easier for them to prove that 
discovery amounted to an undue burden.  In sum, the “undue burden or cost” 
relates not only to the responding party’s financial ability, but also to the 
information’s potential relevance in the ongoing litigation, and the party needs 
to articulate just why the information is both unnecessary and costly to 
produce.  This naturally implicates preliminary discovery, which has its own 
related costs. 
As for what files need to be retained and for how long, cases like Wells v. 
Xpedx shed some light on that question but also raise new ones.  The Wells 
court held that the producing party had the obligation to search through its 
archives to find deleted emails, notwithstanding its document retention policy, 
which held emails for only a specified period of days.  The party never argued 
that the files were not reasonably accessible?  One commentator believed that 
the question hinged on whether the emails were “double deleted,” or where, for 
example, the trash folder is emptied and document recovery necessarily 
requires some sort of forensics examination: 
In my opinion, and that of most commentators and courts that have 
squarely faced the issue, the  obligation to search for “double 
deleted” files should not arise in all circumstances. This duty should 
only arise in certain special circumstances, where, for instance, there is 
evidence that  highly relevant emails have been double-deleted, and 
therefore that there is good cause to go to the extra time and expense 
inherent in a forensic examination for such files. Most courts do not 
require an extraordinary search for deleted files, unless and until 
special circumstances are shown to warrant such extraordinary 
efforts.90 
Ultimately, for some time, cases like Zubulake encouraged a Luddite-like 
approach to technology, where shredding everything and not knowing the 
                                                 
90 Ralph Losey, When Should You Search for Deleted Files?, 
http://ralphlosey.wordpress.com/2007/06/02/when-should-you-search-for-deleted-files/ (last 
accessed Dec. 15, 2007). 
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contents of one’s ESI excused conduct91.  But courts are moving toward a trend 
of equating technical incompetence with ESI being not reasonably accessible. 
In essence, they have created a sort of fiduciary duty of care between parties 
and the tribunal itself: parties must in good faith keep themselves (and the 
court) informed.  And, because objecting to discovery is often decided on 
economic terms, parties must additionally be honest about the costs of 
production. 
4. REMOTE FORENSICS SOFTWARE COMPARISON 
The law in this area seems not only to depend upon certain courts’ prior legal 
analyses; but, also upon changing technologies.  Up until recently, the performance 
of remote forensics was somewhat limited, very expensive, or both.  By and large, 
such endeavors were limited to super specialists and large corporations up to this 
point in time. 
Courts have been reticent to require forensic preservation of any computer within a 
litigant’s control due to the cost and effort involved in forensic preservation of 
entire systems where there systems are numerous and geographically disparate.  A 
good recent example is John B. v. Goetz, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 13459 (6th Cir. 
Jun. 26, 2008).  In that case, the appellate court overturned a lower court’s ruling 
that 50 key custodian’s computers had to be forensically preserved as a sanction 
for failure to comply with the District Court’s earlier order on a motion to compel.  
Judge Rogers ruled that ““[t]he provisions in the orders that require the forensic 
imaging of all computers containing responsive ESI constitute an abuse of 
discretion. Id. at *26.  While this case could be distinguishable from other cases on 
the basis that the court considered the privacy concerns of public officials who 
were the respondents, it certainly makes the point that forensic preservation of 
every machine containing relevant ESI will at least be questioned by courts due to 
the effort in effecting such preservation.  Or you could efficiently search many 
disparate systems for responsive data without creating forensic duplicates. 
With the advent of several companies entering the remote forensics market, the 
availability and price of the base software packages have now begun to include 
options that may be considered affordable by future courts.  The feature sets seem 
also to be expansive.  If so, this begs the question:  Does remote forensics now 
allow for economic and efficient ediscovery of all networked computers, thereby 
deeming the data found thereon to be “readily accessible” under the Federal Rules 
                                                 
91 “Zubulake thus creates a perverse disincentive that prevents companies from investing in 
more efficient data storage technologies, because parties with efficient storage systems are 
generally forced to produce more digital documents than parties using legacy storage 
systems. Although companies eventually may determine that the need for a newer storage 
system exceeds the risks posed by broad electronic discovery, litigants should not be forced 
to weigh potential adverse legal consequences against the benefits that could be realized by 
investing in appropriate systems for their business needs.”  Daniel B. Garrie & Matthew J. 
Armstrong, Electronic Discovery and the Challenge Posed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2005 
U.C.L.A. J.L. & TECH. 2 (2005). 
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of Civil Procedure?  To delve into this question, it was necessary to at least do a 
preliminary investigation of the tools available and their feature sets.92  
 It is also imperative to state that preservation with remote forensic tools would 
not likely take place in the same manner as in-person forensics.  For instance, 
in most circumstances, it is still technically very difficult to take a full image of 
a computer over a network connection.  These tools are much more likely to be 
utilized to perform word searches remotely and return files that satisfy those 
queries, or to capture specific files from numerous remote machines.  Both of 
these functions are the strong suit of remote forensic utilities, generally. 
4.1 Analysis of the Current Commercially Available Tools 
The tools under consideration can be categorized in several ways.  One way is 
to categorize them according to when they are installed.  One group has to be 
installed before the incident or situation to be investigated (Proactive or 
Preventative), while another group can be installed after the incident or 
situation to be investigated (Reactive or Investigatory).  Most reactive solutions 
require installation of an executable file or servelet on the target computer(s).  
Examples of packages we consider proactive include: Guidance Software 
EnCase Enterprise / EDiscovery, AccessData Enterprise / Ediscovery, Paraben 
P2 Enterprise, Wetstone Livewire.  Examples of packages that we consider to 
be reactive include: Tech Pathways ProDiscover IR, Paraben P2 Shuttle, and F-
Response Consultant Edition. 
A second possible categorization is by price.  For our purposes, we will 
consider three price levels, expensive (high five figure to six figure price), 
moderate (high four figure to low five figure price), and inexpensive (low four 
figure price).  We considered the following to be relatively more expensive: 
EnCase Enterprise / EDiscovery, AccessData Enterprise / Ediscovery.  We 
considered the following to be realatively moderately priced: Paraben P2 
Enterprise, Wetstone Livewire, Tech Pathways Prodiscover IR, Paraben P2 
Shuttle.  Finally, we considered F-Response Consultant Edition to be the least 
expensive, though it is really a conduit for other computer forensic tools and 
not a standalone remote forensic solution. 
With regard to E-Discovery, we believe the following features should be 
available: ability to image a computer over the network, multiple image 
formats, disk preview over the network, searching over the network, live 
analysis (including physical memory dump) over the network, and encryption 
of transmitted data.  Also considered were: price, ease of use (does the new 
                                                 
92  Please note that we did not deliberately leave out any solution commercially available in the 
United States.  One may also argue that there are several free-ware solutions available, such 
as Helix.  They are powerful and inexpensive (i.e. free).  However, due to the fact that there 
is not a product being sold, marketed and supported in the United States utilizing Helix as a 
remote forensics tool, we did exclude it from consideration.  Perhaps, discussion of same will 
be covered in future article. 
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software require training) and additional equipment needs (does the solution 
require the user to buy a server). 
Below is a brief discussion of each software solution.  We have tried to address 
each of the features above and have made every attempt to present the most 
current information available.  Many of the products listed have other desirable 
features such as Incident Response capabilities, but these are beyond the scope 
of this article.   
EnCase Enterprise 
Guidance Software’s EnCase Enterprise was one of the first remote 
forensics tools.  Originally released around 2001, it is the most widely 
used enterprise solution and is the product that all others are compared 
to.  This product must be installed across the entire network before the 
analysis can begin. 
Given its high price, Enterprise includes a rich feature set. Additional 
functionality can be added by purchasing the E-Discovery module.  
Using this combination, it is possible to image a workstation across the 
network, though the type of image will be limited to EnCase’s 
proprietary .e01 format.  Remote disk previewing and searching are 
supported and all transmitted data can be encrypted.  Using the E-
Discovery module allows searching across the entire network 
simultaneously.  Live analysis is listed as a feature, including a remote 
physical memory dump.  Because of its size and complexity, 
Enterprise / EDiscovery does have steep hardware requirements (it 
requires its own server) and does require training (though a year-long 
training pass in included).  The price tag is high (even small 
installations can be six figures), but it is intended to provide a complete 
internal E-Discovery solution. 
EnCase claims the product is installed in half of the Fortune 50 
companies, 100 of the Fortune 500 and has been cited in over 50 court 
cases.  It has garnered acclaim from Socha-Gelbmann and the Gartner 
Report.  For more information, visit www.encase.com.   
Access Data 
Access Data Enterprise / EDiscovery is most a more recently 
developed solution.  It was released in early 2008 and at this point has 
limited adoptions.  Designed to compete head to head with EnCase 
Enterprise / EDiscovery, this product must also be installed across the 
entire network before  an analysis can begin.   
Like EnCase’s products, the AccessData Enterprise installation 
performs many of the needed tasks, but can be supplemented with the 
E-Discovery module for advanced functionality.  Remote disk imaging 
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and preview, and remote searching across the entire network are 
possible with transmitted data encrypted for security.  Many output 
formats are possible (dd, e01, smart) as with the stand-alone FTK 
Imager product.  AccessData also boasts the ability to image multiple 
nodes simultaneously.  Similar to EnCase, purchasing a separate server 
is recommended.  AccessData provides training at installation, with no 
further training recommendations other than familiarity with their FTK 
forensic products.  The Enterprise and E-Discovery interfaces 
correspond to the new FTK 2.0 GUI that has been recently released.  
Pricing is in the same tier with EnCase Enterprise and E-Discovery.93 
Although too new to have a long client list, AccessData will likely be 
competitive with companies that have already chosen FTK as their 
primary forensics tool.  For more information, visit 
www.accessdata.com.   
Paraben’s P2 Enterprise 
Paraben’s P2 Enterprise is a full featured product designed to compete 
with the products from AccessData and Guidance Software, but at a 
more moderate price point.  In addition, it appears to provide E-
Discovery functionality with no additional module required.  This may 
make a full enterprise and ediscovery solution available to small and 
medium sized businesses who could never justify the expense of the 
“big two”.  The product is relatively new, originally released in early 
2007. 
Paraben’s product has the ability to image over the network, preview 
disks, remotely search and do live analysis including physical memory 
dumps, all while sending the data in encrypted format.  It can image in 
a logical or physical form that is output to a raw format that Paraben 
calls PFR (named for Paraben’s imaging software: Paraben Forensic 
Replicator).  It also has some unique proactive monitoring functions 
such as tracking intellectual property and logging chat activity even 
when the user’s logging features are turned off.  One of the unique 
functions of Paraben’s product is that it is designed to scale to the full 
size of the network and can work with as many machines as desired at 
once.  Paraben’s product requires a separate server like the other 
vendors in this area.  Training is included in the costs associated with 
the onsite installation of this product.  For more information, visit 
www.paraben.com.   
                                                 
93  A significant number of practitioners have had difficulty getting FTK 2.0 to operate properly.  
This may cause practitioners to be wary of Access Data’s enterprise solutions.  It should be 
noted that at the time we wrote this article, Access Data was devoting serious resources to 
revising FTK 2.0. 
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Wetstone’s Livewire 
Wetstone’s Livewire is also a full featured product with a smaller price 
tag.  Although Livewire has been around since about 2004, a recent 
update with a brand new GUI interface makes it seem new.  Several 
features from the older version are not yet available on the update, but 
according to company representatives these capabilities should be 
available again soon.  The product can preview disks, image a disk, 
create a physical memory dump and perform keyword searches across 
the network though the output is limited to raw or dd format.  No 
additional hardware is needed and training requirements are minimal 
due to the new GUI interface and company webinars.  Livewire is 
priced at about $10,000 and claims users from both law enforcement 
and Fortune 500 companies.  For more information, visit 
www.wetstonetech.com.   
TechPathway’s ProDiscover 
TechPathway’s ProDiscover IR has been around since 2004.  The 
network capabilities were a natural extension of the existing 
ProDiscover forensic products.  As this is a reactive solution, 
deployment is not necessary before the incident occurs.  The software 
can image a disk, preview a disk, perform a physical memory dump, 
and perform keyword searches on a single computer connected to the 
network.  Scripting allows the processing of multiple computers in 
serial fashion.  Output format is limited to a raw type format with a 
header and footer and sessions are encrypted for security.  Although no 
additional hardware is required, the vendor does recommend a three 
day training session to familiarize the new user with the software.  The 
product enjoys relatively wide adoption with many high profile 
government agencies and Fortune 500 companies.  ProDiscover IR 
boasts an easy to use interface, relatively high acquisition speeds 
across network connections and the ability to easily and quickly push 
and pull the remote agent to and from the target machine.  In addition, 
the software has been vetted in both civil and criminal court.  For more 
information, visit www.techpathways.com.   
Paraben’s P2 Shuttle 
Paraben’s reactive solution is P2 Shuttle.  Like all reactive software, it 
does not have to be deployed before the incident occurs.  Shuttle can 
image a disk, preview a disk, search systems, and perform a physical 
memory dump from any computer on the network using an encrypted 
session.  Like P2 Enterprise the image output is limited to the PFR 
format.  A few  unique features are Shuttle’s ability to search up to 25 
computers simultaneously and the ability to do screen captures.  
Although no additional hardware is required, the software does require 
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access to a MySQL database.  Although Paraben offers a four day 
class, the company also offers web demos and  contends the software  
is very easy to use.  Shuttle, like Paraben’s Enterprise product, was 
released in early 2007. At its price point, there are few, if any other 
products that can compare. For more information, visit 
www.paraben.com.   
F-Response 
F-Response Consultant Edition is a unique solution to the enterprise 
forensics problem.  Released in 2008 (though tested for years), F-
Response creates a read only connection between the analysis machine 
and any other computer on the network.  This allows the investigator 
the ability to use any forensic tool to do imaging or analysis.  The 
connection allows the forensic software to act on the remote disk as if 
it was physically connected to the analysis machine.  Because F-
Response is tool independent it is a versatile solution due to the fact 
that it allows most forensic practitioners to continue to use the software 
that they currently utilize.  Remote imaging, previewing and searching 
are all possible.  Image formats are endless; limited only by tool 
choices.  Searches across the entire network are limited by the number 
of disks that can simultaneously be mounted and searched in the 
chosen forensic software.  Although F-Response does not offer an 
internal ability to encrypt transmitted data, it does support Microsoft 
IPSEC encryption.  Although physical memory dumping is not 
currently possible, the company believes it will be able to provide this 
functionality by early 2009.  No additional hardware is required, 
though obviously the user will need to provide the forensics software 
to image or analyze a computer disk.  The company provides videos 
showing the use of the product and claims that no further training is 
needed.  All three versions of the software are inexpensive, which is 
one of the big selling points of this solution.  If the user already owns 
forensics software, F-Response extends the capabilities of that 
software greatly.  The idea is to give the client with an existing copy of 
FTK (or other software) enterprise level capabilities for very little 
money.  For more information, visit www.f-response.com.   
Although the basic functionality of many of these products is similar, each one 
is unique.  Different interfaces, ease of use, price and hardware requirements 
might make one a much better choice for a particular user.  Many of these 
products have a demo version so a potential buyer can test the product for a 
short time.  In order to make a basic comparison easier to digest, we have 
prepared a table outlining some of the basic feature sets of these products:  
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 EnCase 
Enterprise/  
Ediscovery 
AccessData 
Enterprise/ 
Ediscovery 
P2 
Enterprise
Wetstone 
Livewire 
ProDiscover 
IR 
P2 
Shuttle 
F-Response 
Image over 
network 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Output 
format 
e01 dd, e01, 
smart 
Pfr (dd) dd dd with 
header/footer 
Pfr (dd) Any format 
possible 
Disk 
Preview 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Keyword 
Searches 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes, single 
machine  
Yes Yes 
Physical 
Memory 
Dump 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No, 
expected 
2009 
Encryption 
of session 
Yes Yes Yes ? Yes Yes Supports 
MS IPSEC 
Price Expensive Expensive Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Inexpensive 
Additional 
Equipment 
Server Server Server None None None Forensic 
Software 
Training 
Required 
Yes Yes Yes Webinars Yes Yes Online 
demos 
 
It is important to note that we have included a rather small comparison feature 
set.  We really only included items that we believed were necessary elements at 
this time. Naturally, all of the products met virtually all of criteria.  
Nevertheless, we don’t mean to convey that these are all similar products in all 
ways.  Each one of these products is different in various ways.  Just because 
they meet the base criteria set forth herein does not mean that they are 
equivalent.  Similarly, just because one or more of these products is more 
expensive does not mean that they will add any features absolutely necessary 
for ediscovery. 
It is equally important to note that the above comparison is based upon the 
company’s own publications of their product’s feature set.  We have not done 
any independent testing to confirm or repudiate those claims.  Certainly, we 
have all experienced products that don’t perform as advertised.  Thus, please 
do not assume that we have endorsed any of these products, nor have we tested 
their advertised feature sets. 
5.  WHAT CAN BE DERIVED? 
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(B), litigants need only produce 
ESI that is “readily accessible.”94  The applicable rule defines “readily 
accessible” in terms of burden and cost.95  Nevertheless, they still have a duty 
to preserve – not produce - all relevant evidence within their possession and 
control, regardless of burden and cost.96 
Courts have looked at many different factors to determine whether the burden 
                                                 
94  Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
95  Id. 
96  Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B), Advisory Committee Note of 2006. 
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and cost of producing certain ESI renders it not “readily accessible”, both before 
and after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were modified.  Much of the 
discussions about whether documents were readily accessible concentrated in the 
form that the ESI was held.97  Other courts refused to make strict delineations 
along those lines, rather concentrating on analysis of burden and cost of that 
particular production.98  One thing remains clear, the lesser the cost, the lesser the 
burden, the more likely to be deemed readily accessible.   
This certainly begs the question of whether smaller firms may get an advantage.  
This derives from what we call the Mercedes-to-moped analogy.   If you can 
imagine you require two of your vendors to pick up packages at 5 geographically 
dispersed locations on a very tight schedule.  If it’s too hard, you might give 
them a break.  But, you initially want them both to try.  To get there you’d have 
to travel at a high rate of speed.  The vendor with the Mercedes doesn’t have as 
much of a problem.  They just travel at a high rate of speed and get the job done.  
If the job proves too much, then they just go out and rent a few average cars and 
make separate trips.  Not a problem.  The vendor with the moped has a harder 
time.  They don’t have the capabilities to make the trip with just their moped.  
They would have to go out and find another solution, such as rent average cars.  
However, this is a bigger burden to the moped vendor since they have a moped 
budget.  Thus, like the moped vendor who might get excused from picking up all 
5 packages, smaller firms might get excused from producing geographically 
dispersed electronically stored information.  It might be a little strange; but, 
smaller firms may get an advantage under the current law. 
It naturally follows that any products that would tend to make production of ESI 
cheaper and easier could have a definite effect on what courts’ deem readily 
accessible in any particular case.  Certainly, if we could just wish the data out of 
our computer systems, courts would be likely to hold that all relevant data must 
be produced no matter where it may be found.  Technology has not advanced 
that far, however, and the remote forensics discipline, including the tools 
necessary to own and to conduct it, is still advancing forward.  The present 
software set advertises that it is capable of forensically acquiring relevant data 
across large distances.  The financial costs involved therein vary, however, from 
the hundreds to the hundreds of thousands dollars to implement.  In some cases, 
however, they do appear low enough that one could speculate judges will begin 
ruling that data sets residing in geographically disparate computers are readily 
accessible using remote forensics.  However, until that actually happens, we will 
have to wait and see.  We do think, however, that it is a question of when, not if, 
that will occur. 
                                                 
97  See e.g. Quinby v. WestLBAG (S.D.N.Y. Dec 15, 2005)(archiving data onto back-up tapes 
makes that data inaccessible). 
98  See e.g. Semsroth v. City of Wichita (D. Kan. Nov. 15, 2006)(rejecting making blanket 
exceptions to accessibility, like back-up tapes). 
 
